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Abstract: This article tests whether workers are indifferent between risky and safe jobs 
provided that, in labour market equilibrium, wages should serve as a utility equalizing device. 
Workers’ preferences are elicited through a partial measure of overall job satisfaction:  
satisfaction with job-related risk. Given that selectivity turns out to be important, we use 
selectivity corrected models. Results show that wage differentials do not exclusively 
compensate workers for being in dangerous jobs. However, as job characteristics are 
substitutable in workers’ utility, they could feel satisfied, even if they were not fully 
compensated financially for working in dangerous jobs. 
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Introduction 
When accepting a given job, a worker implicitly agrees with a whole set of costs and benefits 
associated to it. In fact, the benefits should, generally speaking, weakly offset the costs, 
making the worker prefer the job to unemployment and this specific job to other jobs 
available in the economy. This intuitive idea was formalized in the theory of compensating 
wage differentials2 (CWD), according to which, a worker’s wage from a specific job should 
compensate his effort and other psychological costs and disutilities experienced as a 
consequence of the whole set of job characteristics. 
In this framework, our paper focuses on a specific type of disutility experienced by workers, 
the likelihood of being physically or mentally injured while undertaking any of the tasks 
included in the job description (Wei, 1999). The main novelty of this paper is the distinction 
made between the effect of the wage differential for job riskiness on overall job satisfaction 
and the effectiveness of the differential to compensate for job riskiness alone.  
Job riskiness is a central issue in labour market regulation in all modern countries. However, 
most of the studies on compensating wage differentials (Sandy and Elliott, 1996; Daniel and 
Sofer, 1998; Wei, 1999, Arabsheibani and Marin, 2000; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) explore 
whether wages compensate workers for working in a dangerous jobs, but not whether this 
compensation is sufficient to offset the disutility suffered due to the risk. Thus, leaving 
unanswered questions like: “Do wages behave as a utility-equalizing device in the sense of 
the theory of compensating differentials?”, “Would the premium offered by the market keep 
the worker in a dangerous work as satisfied as someone in a safer job?” For example, some 
studies have already found that wage differentials do not compensate for all working 
conditions (Baudelot and Gollac, 1993; Godechot and Gurgand, 2000). Godechot and 
                                                 
2 First proposed by Adam Smith (1776) in the Wealth of ations, followed by Mincer (1958), Becker (1964) 
and Rosen (1986). 
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Gurgand, (2000) measure the effect of various job dis-amenities and efforts on a wage 
equation in order to test whether workers are sufficiently satisfied with their wage premium 
accounting for these dis-amenities or efforts. They find that while some bad working 
conditions may be sufficiently compensated for, it is also true that workers have distinct 
preferences and expectations for the compensation they should receive for each one of them.  
Recent studies have explored the connection between various measures of job dis-amenities 
and job satisfaction. Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) explore the effect of employment 
protection legislation and unemployment insurance benefits on satisfaction with security in 
Europe. They find that satisfaction with job security is negatively related to such legislation 
but positively affected by generous unemployment insurance benefits. Furthermore, 
Böckerman et al. (2011) investigate how firm dynamics affect job satisfaction. They find that 
wage differentials do compensate for the negative effects of uncertainly in firms that have a 
high turnover of employees.  
Lalive (2007) investigates the determination of individual wages and job satisfaction by using 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in US. He shows that wage differentials do not 
compensate for work conditions. Stutzer and Frey (2008) using the German Socio-Economic 
Panel Study find that commuters report a lower level of subjective well-being, but, other 
things being equal, they do not get higher wages in response to this. Along this line, our study 
intends to address the above questions by using risk-related job satisfaction as a partial 
measure of overall job satisfaction. We assume that satisfaction with job-related risk will not 
vary with the wage rate if wages compensate exactly for working in risky jobs. Thus, 
concentrating only on workers’ self-reported satisfaction we test the applicability of the 
theory on compensating differentials to job riskiness. 
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Additionally, the examination of whether wage differentials act as a utility equalizing device 
on job risk makes it possible to correct for several potential biases related to the empirical 
estimations. In particular, we investigate the problem of sample selection. This may arise if 
the decision to work in a dangerous job is not random. For example, some workers may 
choose jobs with bad working conditions precisely because of the compensating differentials, 
while others may simply be less adverse to these kinds of jobs because of a different attitude 
towards risk.  
 
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 begins by describing the framework of 
compensating differentials adapted to the issue of job risk. At the same time, the empirical 
biases usually found in the relevant literature are exposed. Section 3 presents the relationship 
between satisfaction and the theory of compensating differentials. Section 4 develops the test 
of compensating differentials for dangerous jobs. Section 5 gives background on the dataset 
and some preliminary evidence. Section 6 reports the results and Section 7 concludes.  
 
1. The theory of compensating differentials and job risk 
The theory of compensating differentials tries to explain wage disparities in the labour market 
assuming that the employees have different preferences for different job attributes and that 
jobs are different too. The key implication of the theory is that, as long as all persons in the 
population agree on whether a particular job characteristic is “good” or “bad“, those working 
under good  conditions would be paid less (making workers “buy” the enjoyable 
environment) and those working under bad conditions would be paid more (Rosen, 1986). 
The theory is immediately applicable to the case of wage compensations for bearing the risk 
of injury or even death3. Most workers can be expected to value both higher wages and 
                                                 
3 An important strand of empirical studies have investigated the relationship between a wage premium and 
undesirable working conditions other than risky jobs (for a review, see Rosen 1986). Bad working conditions 
usually refer to dangerous and stressful conditions at the workplace (Duncan and Holmlund, 1983; French and 
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greater levels of safety, but some are presumed to be willing to accept some additional risk in 
exchange for a higher wage yielding the same overall level of utility. Thus, firms accounting 
for worker heterogeneity regarding the appropriate wage-safety tradeoff, may choose to 
invest in costly procedures, rather than economizing on safety and redistributing the savings 
among workers in the form of higher wages. This has important implications both for firm 
strategies and public policy towards risky jobs. 
 
Many empirical studies report a positive relationship between wages and unsafe working 
conditions. A survey of some earlier studies, together with an investigation into the variety of 
results, can be found in Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982). More recent surveys can be found 
in Meng and Smith (1990); Martinello and Meng (1992); Sandy and Elliott (1996); Daniel 
and Sofer (1998); Wei (1999); Arabsheibani and Marin (2000); Viscusi and Aldy (2003). In 
general, the evidence is ambiguous. Some studies find that, while fatal risk has a positive and 
significant effect on wages, non-fatal risk tends to have negative and insignificant effects on 
wages (Arabsheibani and Marin, 2000). Some studies find that both variables have positive 
and significant effects (Garen 1988). However, when some other factors are taken into 
account (such as union status or industry-level variables) the apparent ubiquity of the positive 
relationship between job risk and wages breaks down (Sandy and Elliott, 1996; Dorman and 
Hagstrom, 1998; Daniel and Sofer, 1998). Yet, the positive and statistically significant wage 
premium for fatal job risks provides the most robust empirical support for the theory of 
compensating differentials (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). Some authors have recognized that the 
divergent results found in the literature on compensating differentials are due to the existence 
of several biases. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Dunlap, 1998), inconvenient location and commuting time (Stutzer and Frey, 2008), shift work and flexible 
working hours (Kostiuk, 1990; Gariety and Shaffer, 2001; Lanfranchi et al, 2002) and perception of job 
instability measured by product market volatility (Morreti, 2000; Magnani, 2002).  
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An omitted-variable bias due to the correlation between unobserved worker productivity 
(such as talent, innate ability) and job risk has been indicated by some authors (Brown, 1980; 
Duncan and Holmlund, 1983; Hwang, Reed and Hubbard, 1992). For instance, more able 
workers are likely to earn higher wages, and these workers will probably “spend” some of 
their additional income on job amenities. Thus, more able workers will have higher wages 
and higher levels of the desired job amenities. Additionally, a major concern in the literature 
on compensating differentials is the issue of self-selection (Lee, 1978; Kostiuk, 1990; 
Lanfranchi et al, 2002; Purse, 2004). One reason is that, when fatality or injury risk is a 
normal good, employees with high earnings potential (e.g. better educated workers) will 
select themselves into safer jobs (Viscusi, 1978). 
 
There are also several empirical studies that do not support the hypothesis of compensating 
wage differentials attributing the failure to market frictions and imperfect information 
(Dickens and Katz, 1987; Krueger and Summer, 1988; Brown and Medoff, 1989; Kruse, 
1992; Gronberg and Reed; 1994; Dorman and Hagstrom, 1998; Sandy and Elliott, 1996; 
Daniel and Sofer, 1998; Arabsheibani and Marin, 2000; Bender and Mridha, 2011). More 
specifically, labour market segmentation and dualism theory predict a positive relationship 
between wages and good working conditions. The theory of labour market segmentation  (see 
e.g., Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Cahuc and Zajdela, 1991) initially distinguishes between two 
segments, one characterized by better, permanent, well-paid jobs with career prospects (the 
‘primary segment’), and the other having temporary, poorly paid jobs without any career 
prospects (the ‘secondary segment’). In a recent study Bender and Mridha (2011) show that 
the standard CWD theory does not necessarily hold because labour market forces may fail to 
induce firms to pay a CWD. 
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The literature also addresses problems with measuring risk compensation. The job risk has 
been measured in a number of ways and it relies, with few exceptions, upon risk measures 
which are available by industrial or occupational category (Thaler and Rosen, 1975; Brown, 
1980; Arnould and Nichols, 1983; Garen, 1988; Dorman and Hagstrom, 1998). Few studies 
(Hamermesh, 1978; Viscusi, 1978, 1979; Biddle and Zarkin 1988; Fairris, 1989; Gegax et al, 
1991; Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2006) have been based on workers’ perception of their job 
risk.  A possible explanation for the scarcity of subjective assessment studies on job riskiness 
is that most of the available datasets4 do not include information on the worker’s perceived 
job attributes.  
 
In addition to the scarcity of the datasets which include the perceived individual risk, many 
researchers are reluctant to use subjective assessments of risk because part of the literature on 
psychology and economics has documented biases in individual assessments. The literature 
on risk perception found that individuals respond differently to risks depending on whether 
they are seen as violations of personal autonomy (Starr, 1969; Dorman, 1996). As a result, 
they feel a lower aversion to risks they take for themselves than to risks that they regard as 
being imposed on them by others. A second problem is that people tend to overestimate low 
probability events and to underestimate high probability ones (Kahneman and Trevsky, 
1979). This should also apply to job choice. For the overwhelming majority of jobs, the risk 
of a fatal accident is very low. From the evidence on how people make other types of 
decisions, it seems likely that most people ignore the probability of a fatal injury when 
choosing a job. Hence, if many people do not pay attention to such risks, employers have 
limited incentives to pay compensating differences. Thus, measured differences may not 
                                                 
4 To the knowledge of the authors, the University of Michigan’s Survey of Working Conditions (SWC), the 
Quality Employment Survey (QES) and the EPICURUS dataset are the only datasets including a subjective risk 
variable obtained from workers’ perception of their jobs’ dangerous and unhealthy conditions. However, the 
other two studies are cross section data obtained from American respondents. Thus, the dataset analyzed here is 
the only one with a panel structure including a question on perceived job risk by European workers.  
  
8 
 
reflect workers’ willingness to accept a compensation for taking those risks but, rather, 
employers’ costs of providing the corresponding safety measures (Dickens, 1985). However, 
this suggests that many workers do not know how dangerous a job is when they take it, and 
learn over time. Thus, one can assume that individual perceptions when workers already have 
the job provide an accurate measure of job risk. Lastly, it is found that survey respondents 
overreact to newly identified risks. The original argument was advanced by Slovic in the 
1970s (see Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971). However, as stated by Viscusi and O’Conner 
(1984), these effects may not be as great in job safety contexts, probably because workers’ 
familiarity with job risks make them less alarmed by information regarding a minor increase 
in risk.  
 
This study assumes that self-reported information on job risk is a broad concept covering 
much more than the occupational accidents officially recognized by national insurance 
systems5. The way in which workers perceive their job dangerousness will be useful for an 
outsider evaluating job risk, and it probably affects economic outcomes. While it is unlikely 
to perceive the job risk as revealed in the labour market, a worker feeling that there is a high 
probability of being killed or suffering physical injury may be less motivated and may even 
leave the job voluntarily (Viscusi 1979). Furthermore, depending on a job’s dangerousness, a 
worker will be more or less likely to invest in firm-specific human capital that will increase 
his/her commitment to the employer. Therefore, this subjective indicator could be a 
substantial value for labour market analysis for firm strategies and economic policy towards 
risky jobs. 
 
                                                 
5 As argued by Viscusi (1993), the ideal risk measure would reflect subjective assessment of the risk of a job by 
both the workers and the firm, but in practice we have a less perfect measure. The only exception known which 
used linked firm-worker data is the paper by Dale-Olsen (2005) and Lalive et al (2006). 
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2. Satisfaction and compensating wage differentials for job risk 
This section introduces some approaches used in the literature for testing the theory of 
compensating differentials that do not only rely on the hedonic wage methodology, but also 
on stated job satisfaction used as a subjective proxy of utility at work (Godechot and 
Gurgand, 2000; Clark, 2003; Stutzer and Frey, 2008; Lalive, 2007; Böckerman and 
IImakunnas, 2006, Helliwell and Huang, 2010; and Böckerman et al, 2011).  
 
To illustrate this framework, consider the linear specification: 
wDXaU γδβ +++=  (1) 
KDw piµφ ++=     (2) 
where U  is job satisfaction, X and K  are vectors of exogenous variables. We denote by D  
the probability of injury on the job and define w  as the worker’s wage rate (or its natural 
logarithm), whereas α and φ are constants. 
 
A compensating wage differential would imply that γ
δµ −= .6  Applying this in the wage 
equation (2) and then inserting the wage equation into the utility function (1) we get: 
 
γφpiγβ +++= KXaU  (3) 
 
In this setting, the existing literature proposes two ways of testing for compensating wage 
differentials when using job satisfaction as a proxy for utility. 
 
Changing notations as: γφαα +=′
,
ββ ='
,
γpipi =′  , one empirical strategy is to check 
whether 0=′δ  holds in the job satisfaction equation 
                                                 
6 Note that 0>µ
 
or 0<µ  are sufficient conditions to reject the theory 
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DKXaU δpiβ ′+′+′+′=  (4) 
where wage is not included, assuming that satisfaction is independent of the working 
conditions. This empirical strategy is employed by Godechot and Gurgand (2000), Clark 
(2003), Böckerman and IImakunnas, (2006) and Stutzer and Frey (2008). 
 
Alternatively, compensating wage differentials can be tested by checking whether 0=′γ  in 
the job satisfaction equation 
wKXaU γpiβ ′+′++′=  (5) 
where dis-amenities are not included and which would imply that the wage differential 
offered by the market would be just enough to keep the worker on the same indifference 
curve. This test is applied by Lalive (2007). 
 
Consistently with the above models, this study examines whether wages act as a utility 
equalizing device by assuming that satisfaction will not vary with the wage rate if wages 
compensate exactly for the bad working conditions. However, the main econometric issue is 
that the coefficient γ  from the estimated model (equation 5) should be unbiased. However, 
this may not be the case if some workers choose jobs with bad working conditions because of 
the compensating differentials while others prefer these jobs because they have different 
attitudes towards risk. Thus, the issue of self-selection is crucial to the analysis. This study 
attempts to provide unbiased estimates for γ . It thus relies on an endogenous switching 
regression model (Maddala, 1983). 
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3. A test of compensating wage differentials for risky jobs using endogenous 
switching regression models 
 
Some workers may choose dangerous jobs because of the compensating differentials while 
others, with a lower aversion to danger prefer riskier jobs and therefore make wage premiums 
unnecessary. Thus, the estimate of the necessary compensating differential will be biased 
downwards. Additionally, in the framework of the endogenous switching regression model, 
wages are allowed to be different across the two groups. Wages in dangerous jobs may be 
identified by different characteristics from those in safe jobs, so that the data should not be 
pooled. Suppose that employers give a wage premium to employees with individual 
characteristics such as education or experience in order to reduce the accidents in the jobs. 
Thus, two different regimes are distinguished, one for those working in a dangerous job and 
one for those working in a safe job.  
 
The switching regression model estimates the following system describing log wages for 
dangerous ( dw ) and ( sw ) for safe jobs. 
 
Situation 1:   ddd uXw += β   for 1=C   (6a) 
Situation 2:  sss uXw += β   for 0=C   (6b) 
 
and one “selection” equation which determines which sector is chosen by the individuals, 
where C  is the dangerous job choice.  
 
Dangerous Job Choice: 33 υτ += ZC       (7)  [reduced form] 
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In the wage equations (6), dw  and sw  are the log hourly wages
7 of workers in dangerous and 
safe jobs, respectively, X is a vector of exogenous variables, while du , su  are unobserved 
random errors. In equation (7), C  is a binary variable for a dangerous job, taking the value 1 
when the job is dangerous and zero otherwise, Ζ  is a vector of variables influencing the 
choice of a dangerous job and υ  is an error term. Note that, in the reduced form (7), Ζ  must 
contain all the X variables. Among the extra variables, there should be at least one which 
permits model identification. This variable is the instrument. This variable must affect wage 
only via its effect on the choice of a worker being in a dangerous job. In our model, the 
income of other household members is used as an instrument8. 
 
Equation (7) is estimated using a Probit model capturing sample selection. Inverse Mill ratios 
)(
)(
δ
δϑ )
)
iΖΦ
Ζ
 are obtained, where (.)ϑ  and (.)Φ are, respectively, the probability density 
and cumulative functions of the standard normal distribution, which are then used to correct 
for selectivity bias and obtain unbiased estimates of the wages (6) by estimating: 
 
)(
)(
δ
δϑσβ )
)
i
ddd Xw ΖΦ
Ζ+=      (8a) 
)(1
)(
δ
δϑσβ )
)
i
sss Xw ΖΦ−
Ζ
−=      (8b) 
 
assuming that the covariances sd σσ ,  between the reduced-form equation (7) and the wage 
equations errors are non zero. Estimates of sd σσ ,  indicate the nature of self-selection into 
each sector. Positive selection into each sector implies a positive dσ  and a negative sσ . In an 
                                                 
7 These are wage averages obtained by dividing the total regular monthly income from the main employment by 
the total amount of hours worked usually, excluding overtime. 
8 The appropriateness of the chosen instrument is discussed in detail in section 6. 
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economic context, positive selection means that workers select themselves into each one of 
the two sectors because of preferences or comparative advantages. Negative selection into a 
dangerous job implies that workers prefer to avoid dangerous jobs, but they seem to have 
chosen them because of the risk premium or because they could not find other jobs. 
 
Note that, following Maddala (1983), one can rewrite equations (8) as: 
)()()()()( δϑσσδβββ )) isdisds XXwE Ζ−+ΖΦ−+=    (9) 
Assuming that both categories have identical coefficients ( sd ββ =  and )sd γγ =  for all 
X except for the constants, we rewrite equation (9), as follows, which is known as treatment 
effect model: 
             
)()()()( δϑσσδαβ )) isdiXwE Ζ−+ΖΦ+=       (10) 
where α  is equal to the difference in wages and captures the effect of a dangerous work on 
the wage. 
 
Finally, equation (11) describes satisfaction with job-related risk, which is chosen instead of 
overall job satisfaction due to the exanimation of only one characteristic of the job: its 
dangerousness. Therefore, it is examined whether workers are sufficiently satisfied with their 
monetary compensation for this specific dis-amenity. As Adam Smith stated, jobs differ in 
many characteristics, all of which can give rise to compensating differentials. In this study, it 
is supposed that jobs differ in only one characteristic: the dangerousness of the job. The 
choice of this specific part of job satisfaction is very important in our framework as one could 
feel reasonably satisfied with the dangerousness of his/her job, but dissatisfied with many 
other aspects such as working times, security, type of job, etc. This is particularly true in the 
sense that a worker’s wage might include compensation for job dangerousness but also for a 
variety of other dis-amenities. To ensure that this strategy correctly identifies the effect under 
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study, employer characteristics that are controlled for in the model partly capture the role of 
the remaining job characteristics in wage determination. 
  
ελγ +−+= )( sd wwXS  for C=1 /0 (11) 
In equation (11), the satisfaction variable, S , is a latent one. The appropriate model is the 
ordered Probit model. In an ordered Probit model, the latent probability of reporting a job 
satisfaction level *S is: 
 
)1,0(~| ormalXε  
 
 
 
where X  is a vector of exogenous personal and work-related characteristics, γ is a vector of 
coefficients to be estimated, and ε indicates the error term. Assuming that jµµµ <<< ...21  
where jµµ ,...1 are the cutoff points for the latent variable, 
   







>
≤≤
≤
=
j
21
1
*
S* if j,
...
µS*µ if 1,
µS* if 0,
S
µ
  
the parameters γ and µ  can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
The empirical strategy here is to check whether 0=λ ,9 which would imply that the wage 
differential offered by the market would be just enough to keep the worker on the same 
indifference curve. Thus, if wage differentials only reflect compensation for risky jobs, 
workers will not prefer jobs with high wages to jobs with low wages10. The alternative 
                                                 
9 One may argue that this empirical model focuses only on injury risk. But in reality the wage is (potentially) 
affected by many different compensating differentials. If these are correlated with injury risk, it would bias the 
results that are being generated here. However one should consider (i) which attributes should be included and 
which ones should not, (ii) the potentially relevant attributes are not necessarily observable and (iii), even if they 
were, the resulting model would be a very complex one.  
10 The differential wd-ws is the predicted value difference of wages for dangerous and safe jobs for each worker. 
ελγ +−+=Φ= − )()( *1 sd wwXSS
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hypothesis of non-competitive determination of the wage structure 0>λ or 0<λ
 
would 
indicate dualism of the labour market. If this alternative view of the labour market dominates 
the competitive view, one may find that wage increases/decreases will be reflected on 
higher/lower reported satisfaction levels (Clark, 2003).  
 
4. Job risk, satisfaction and wages: First empirical evidence from a European 
survey 
Our analysis uses the EPICURUS dataset11. The survey includes general questions, aimed at 
identifying the respondent’s individual characteristics. Questions concerning age, gender, 
marital status, employment status, education, occupation and socio-economic and labour 
market status characteristics, are included. The respondent is also asked several questions 
related to income, and about aspects related to job satisfaction, as well as satisfaction with 
several features of work.  
 
In this study, a sub-sample of 3,030 workers from France, Greece, the UK and the 
Netherlands is used. The sample includes workers occupied in paid employment between 18 
to 65 years of age. Self-employed, retired, and unemployed persons, as well as housewives 
and students are excluded in order to keep the sample homogeneous. Moreover, those whose 
highest qualification is third level education are excluded from the main questionnaire 
because the designers of this questionnaire decided to excluded individuals with an education 
level 5 or 6 (ISCED International Classification 1997) in order to keep the sample as 
homogeneous as possible. All workers were interviewed on line with the exception of Greece 
where face-to-face interviews were conducted. The agency that ran the surveys for Greece, 
                                                 
11 This survey was elaborated in 2004 by the EPICURUS team in the framework of a European project under 
the Fifth Framework Programme “Improving Human Potential” (contract number: HPSE-CT-2002-00143). The 
variables included in our model are defined in the Appendix Table 6. 
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France, United Kingdom and the Netherlands suggested that it was not necessary or useful to 
apply weighing techniques on the data. All the employee groups were sufficiently 
represented. The fieldwork in UK, which was done online, had a gross sampling based on 
age, gender and education level. In the screening phase 654 persons were screened out; and 
1002 respondents completed the interview. For Greece, in the screenings phase, 500 
respondents were screened out because they did not belong to the target population; and 800 
respondents received a complete interview. In the Netherlands in the screening phase 413 
persons were screened out; and 1007 respondents completed the questionnaire.  
 
We distinguish between workers who work in dangerous jobs and those who work in safe 
jobs based on the following question: 
Question: “Would you say that your job is dangerous (risk of physical accidents, contact with 
dangerous products)?” 
Response: “Frequently, sometimes, hardly ever” 
If a worker replies that his/her job is dangerous: either frequently or sometimes, it indicates 
that he/she is working in a dangerous job. Alternatively, if a worker replies that his/her job is 
hardly ever dangerous, the worker is categorized as belonging to the safe job group. 
 
The level of “satisfaction with job-related risk” is derived from the following question:  
 “How satisfied are you with your job’s physical risk?” 
The answers are ranked on a 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) scale. 
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Figure 1 provides a first approach to the negative relation between risk at job and an 
individual’s satisfaction with dangerousness at work. It is found, on average that the workers 
who are most satisfied with job-related risk are in safe jobs and this difference is large 
(81,37%). Approximately only 18,63% of satisfied workers viewed their job as being 
dangerous. For those who are dissatisfied with their job risk, 61,58% of workers believe their 
job is dangerous.  Thus, the fear of a job accident is confined to workers with low satisfaction 
in this domain. However, the raw correlation between job risk and satisfaction does not 
account for wages and the fact that we are comparing people with heterogeneous preferences 
facing different restrictions. Thus, the observed lower satisfaction of people who work in 
dangerous jobs might just reflect that these are people with different socio-demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics.  
 
Table 5 in the Appendix presents sample statistics for workers occupied in dangerous and 
safe jobs, on the basis of their perception of job risk. Each of these variables affects wages 
and, at the same time, determines a worker’s choice of a dangerous job. There is also 
substantial literature suggesting that women are more risk averse than men and those married 
with children are more risk averse than those without (DeLeire and Levy, 2004; Dohmen et 
al, 2005; Sloane and Grazier, 2006). Thus, workers with a strong aversion to risk will tend to 
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make occupational choices which sort them into safer jobs. Hence there are strong empirical 
results showing that workers sort into jobs on the basis of their preferences. Thus, it is 
difficult to separate compensating differentials from returns to skill where the employee is 
being rewarded for his ability to manage the risk inherent in a particular job. This skill might 
result from prior training or experience which enables some workers to be more productive in 
a dangerous job, but such characteristics may not be relevant to a safe job. For example, the 
fact that men are more likely to work in a dangerous job, makes it possible that the “gender 
earnings gap” often found in empirical studies may be partly a compensation for job riskiness 
(Nielsen, 2005). Similarly, unionized workers are more likely to work in dangerous jobs than 
non-union workers. Previous empirical work has shown that unions raise the risk premium 
because they provide members with both more information about occupational risk and a 
mechanism for voicing their concerns about risk, something which is not available to non-
union workers (Thaler and Rosen, 1975). So it is possible that some of the union wage 
differential found in wage studies is actually a compensation for dangerous jobs. As stated 
before, one needs to account for possible biases arising from worker selection into risky or 
non-risky jobs when evaluating the compensating differentials hypothesis.  
 
5. Econometric results 
Table 2 reports, the selectivity-corrected wage equations for workers in dangerous and safe 
jobs12. An important ingredient in the selectivity-corrected models is the instrument which 
permits model identification. In our model, this variable must affect wage only via its effect 
on the choice of a worker to be in a dangerous job. It has been argued that social background 
characteristics do not impact on the wage but on the job decision. To our knowledge only 
Daniel and Sofer (1998) have used two instruments for the choice of a risky job (the number 
                                                 
12 For comparison, Table 7 in the Appendix contains OLS estimates of wages including “job risk” as a dummy 
variable. 
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of children and the log of the spouse’s income). They found that both have significant effect 
on the choice of risky jobs. Accordingly, in this study, whether another household member 
has income13 (inco_household) is used as an instrument for the choice of being in a risky 
job14.  
 
Following Coles et al (2007), one can suggest that job choice may be dependent on 
productivity-irrelevant characteristics. The identifying restriction chosen in our study, 
namely, the household member’s income conforms to the above intuition. In the market 
equilibrium envisaged here, there is a population of workers with different social background 
characteristics (Daniel and Sofer, 1998). In this case, workers who have a comparative 
advantage in taking safe jobs -that is, those who can  be selective because of their extra 
household member’s income - take employment in safe jobs and, in equilibrium, earn a lower 
average wage. Conversely, those who do not have the extra household member’s income take 
more dangerous jobs and enjoy the corresponding wage premium. Additionally, in order to 
provide further evidence on the appropriateness of the chosen instrument the Staiger and 
Stock (1997) test for exogeneity is used. Staiger and Stock (1997) argue that, if the F-statistic 
value associated with the chosen instruments in the first stage regression is above 10, then the 
quality of the instrument is acceptable. In this model the F-stat value is 11.1 indicating that 
the chosen instrument is adequate. 
 
 
Reduced form Probit equation 
We start by presenting the results of the first step of the analysis, the reduced form choice 
equation (7) for the EU sample (Table 1, column 1). The estimation of the choice equation 
                                                 
13 The household income includes labour and capital income of other household members. 
14 The variable “number of children” is not significant in the Probit equation. 
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makes use of the Probit method to identify the factors that influence the decision of 
individuals to work in dangerous jobs. As expected, the household member’s income, the 
variable that affects only the choice process, is highly significant. Those individuals whose 
family members provide the household with extra income are less likely to work in dangerous 
jobs, as compared to those who do not have an additional income from their family. 
 
The results also confirm the picture which already emerges from the raw data (Table 5 in the 
Appendix): the probability of choosing a dangerous job is higher if the worker is male, 
married or having a partner. Educated workers are less likely to be in dangerous jobs. The 
probability of ending up in a dangerous job is an inverse U-shaped function of tenure with a 
maximum reached at around 13 years in the same job. This finding suggests that younger 
workers may be more willing to accept dangerous jobs since they are in the beginning of their 
careers and the possibility of finding a safer job is lower or it might simply be an age-related 
shift in preferences.  
 
Union membership affects positively the choice process. However, this result should be 
interpreted with caution. Many authors emphasize that there is a possible endogenous 
relationship between union status and the choice of a dangerous job (Biddle and Zarkin, 
1988). It could be the case that workers in dangerous jobs are more likely to be unionised in 
order to facilitate communication with the hierarchy or co-workers. 
 
Country-specific effects show that workers in Greece are more willing to accept dangerous 
jobs, followed by French and to a lower extent by British workers. This may signal the 
importance of having a “job” even if it is dangerous in countries such as Greece or France 
with relatively high unemployment rates. 
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The above results confirm the idea that people do not choose jobs at random. It seems that 
this is particularly important when comparing what influences the choice of occupation 
among different groups of workers, as specific groups may have particular preferences. Thus, 
previous estimates of wage premium for dangerous jobs are misleading since they may 
confound equalizing wage effects with inter-personal differences. As stated before, one needs 
to account for any biases arising from worker selection into risky or non-risky jobs when 
evaluating the compensating differentials hypothesis.  
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TABLE 1 Dangerous choice, Probit model, marginal effects 
Reduced form 
Variables Marginal effects z-value 
Co_married   0.080 3.43*** 
Male   0.130 6.54*** 
Tenure   0.010 2.70*** 
Tenure
2
 /100 -0.039 3.32*** 
Secondary education -0.093 3.73*** 
Upper secondary education -0.058 2.21*** 
Children -0.008 0.40 
Trade Unio Mb   0.121 4.75*** 
Manager   0.058 1.74* 
Clerk -0.159 5.92*** 
Craft_skilled   0.303 7.70*** 
Other occupant.   0.133 4.41*** 
Private -0.038 1.68* 
Unempl.Exp   0.053 1.51 
Firm size<99   0.092 3.35*** 
Firm size<500   0.017 0.70 
Sector-Service -0.038 1.23 
Sector -other -0.068 1.96** 
Greece   0.350 10.98*** 
France   0.239 8.03*** 
UK   0.116 3.91*** 
Household member’s income  -0.041 1.92** 
Log likelihood  -1624.76  
Pseudo R2 0.18  
Observations 3,030  
Note*, **,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%  levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 2 Selectivity-corrected wage equations models 
Switching regression model Treatment effect 
model 
 1 2 3 
 Dangerous choice Safe choice All workers 
   coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat  coef  t-stat 
Co_married 0.080      2.07** 0.013 0.47  0.034 1.60 
Male 0.212   3.19*** 0.028 0.68  0.094 2.55** 
Tenure 0.022   3.17*** 0.015 3.07***  0.017 4.56*** 
Tenure
2
/100    -0.053      2.18**    -0.014 0.87 -0.027 2.08*** 
Sec. educated    -0.017      0.35 0.165 4.00***  0.101 3.38*** 
Up_se educated 0.077      1.72* 0.181 4.77***  0.143 5.40*** 
Trade Unio Mb 0.121 2.17**    -0.064 1.51 -0.002 0.08 
Manager 0.201   3.59*** 0.211 4.74***  0.203 6.30*** 
Clerk 0.017      0.18 0.215 4.59***  0.134 3.01*** 
Craft_skilled 0.184      1.58    -0.293 2.84*** -0.133 1.71* 
Other occupant. 0.162 2.34**    -0.015 0.31  0.044 1.07 
Private    -0.172   4.54*** 0.022 0.79 -0.041 2.02** 
Unempl.Exp    -0.076      1.42    -0.069 1.59 -0.074 2.49** 
Firm size<99 0.048      0.93    -0.037 0.97 -0.010 0.33 
Firm size<500 0.002      0.06 0.053 1.81*  0.036 1.78* 
Service_sector    -0.102 2.31** 0.006 0.15 -0.029 1.09 
Other_service    -0.089      1.53 0.025 0.49 -0.012 0.37 
Greece    -0.749   5.57***    -1.242 13.27*** -1.073 13.36*** 
France    -0.025      0.25    -0.341 5.47*** -0.228 4.10*** 
UK    -0.409    6.49***    -0.492 12.02*** -0.458 14.12*** 
Worker being in 
dangerous job 
_ _ _     _ -0.073 1.82* 
Selection term     0.329       1.44 -0.540 2.93*** -0.458 3.22*** 
Constant     1.49     4.06*** 1.689 19.28***  1.96 26.00*** 
Adjusted R2 0.50 
1,096 
0.47 
1,934 
0.49 
3,030 Observations 
Note*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%  levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 4 Overall job satisfaction (ordered Probit) 
Variables Coef t-values 
Male  -0.128 2.93*** 
Tenure  -0.005 0.85 
Tenure
2
/100   0.033 1.68* 
Secondary education  -0.012 0.25 
Upper secondary education  -0.067 1.28 
Unemployment experience  -0.109 1.59 
Trade Union membership  -0.126 2.72*** 
Sector: service  -0.001 0.01 
Sector: other  -0.030 0.41 
Managers   0.190 2.83*** 
Clerks   0.215 3.57*** 
Crafts & Skilled workers  -0.027 0.33 
Other occupations   0.172 2.79*** 
Interaction terms   
Wage differentials* Greece  0.121 1.09 
Wage differentials* France  0.615 3.88*** 
Wage differentials* UK  0.349 3.03*** 
Observations      3,027  
Note*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%  levels, respectively.  
 
TABLE 3 Satisfaction with risk equation (ordered Probit) 
 1  2  
Variables  Coef t-values  Coef t-values 
Male -0.011 0.27 - - 
Tenure -0.008 1.22 - - 
Tenure
2
 /100  0.031 1.52 - - 
Second educated  0.055 1.09  0.025      0.67 
Upper second educated  0.189 3.57***  0.147  2.85*** 
Unemployment experience -0.224 3.11***        -0.190  2.81*** 
Trade Union membership -0.191 3.97*** - - 
Sector: service -0.168 2.76*** -0.203 -2.16** 
Sector: other -0.092 1.23 -0.126       0.70 
Managers  0.204 3.00***  0.175    2.88*** 
Clerks  0.235 3.85***  0.196    3.08*** 
Crafts & Skilled workers -0.136 1.70*        -0.027       0.22 
Other occupations  0.078 1.29  0.092       1.62 
Interaction Terms     
Wage differentials*UK -0.704 6.26***  -0.689    6.21*** 
Wage differentials*France -0.125 0.77 -0.071       0.79 
Wage differentials*Greece -0.548 5.36*** -0.252 1.75* 
Wage differentials*male - - -0.470     4.13*** 
Wage differentials*tenure - - -0.017       1.18 
Wage differentials *Tenure
2
 - -  0.006       1.33 
Wage differentials*Trd.Un. - - -0.100       1.12 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.09  
Observations 3,030   
Note*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1%  levels, respectively.  
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Is selectivity important? 
The results for the reduced form Probit can be used to control for sample selection when 
estimating wage equations for workers observed in dangerous and safe jobs. Table 2 columns 
1 and 2 present the estimates for these wage equations (8). It is found that there is no effect of 
self-selection of workers into dangerous jobs and a positive selection of workers into safe 
jobs. There is evidence of positive selection into safe jobs since the significant negative 
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio (selection term) implies that those less likely to work in 
dangerous jobs are those workers with high unobserved components of safe job wages. A 
more straightforward interpretation is that those choosing safe jobs have a comparative 
advantage or a preference for this kind of jobs. Thus, if workers in safe jobs moved to 
dangerous jobs they might be less satisfied as they put more weight on security than on 
wages, in which case the wage premium would not be enough to equalize their utility. 
 
Table 2, column 3 presents the estimates of the treatment effect model (equation 10). One of 
the principal findings from the switching regression results of Table 2 (columns 1-2) still 
holds for the single-equation estimates, with a significant correlation between the errors in the 
wage and choice equations. Workers with positive unmeasured components of safe jobs 
earnings are less likely to work in dangerous jobs. While the single-equation results are 
consistent with the two-sector model, their validity is rejected by the F-test15. 
 
                                                 
15 The F-test for the equality of coefficients in the two groups is F(20, 3030)=5.42 with Pr > F 0.000 and is 
therefore significantly different from zero. 
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Which is the effect of job risk in wage determination?  
Table 2 (columns 1 and 2) reveals that the variables do not have the same influence in both 
wage equations. The two most important results is the positive effect of union status for 
workers in dangerous jobs and the non significant effect for workers in safe jobs. In the 
literature, it is usually stated that the presence of unions endows workers with some market 
power, a situation which is not considered in the pure theory of compensating differentials. 
An explanation usually put forward suggests that union workers may be better informed than 
non-union workers to have access to reliable information on risk and may be able to employ 
it more effectively when bargaining (Thaler and Rosen, 1975). Thus, some studies find that 
unionized workers obtain substantially higher compensations for fatal risk (Gerax et al, 
1991). In addition, sociologists argue that workers are only compensated for bad working 
conditions when the bad quality of the job is publicly recognized (Baudelot and Gollac, 
1993). Unions are therefore the only means for everyone to recognise whether a working 
condition is good or bad.  
The remaining findings are consistent with the implications of the theoretical literature on 
wages, according to which males have higher wages than women in dangerous jobs. Returns 
to schooling are significant in both equations. Being married is significant in the wage 
equations for workers in dangerous jobs. 
The two wage equations for workers in dangerous and safe jobs can be used to compute the 
wage differential for each person in the sample. The wage rate for workers in safe jobs is 9 
percent higher than for workers in dangerous jobs. Suppose that we erroneously pool the data 
and do not correct for selectivity. The wage differential would then be biased downward by 
6.2 percent.16 If instead we correct for selectivity but still erroneously pool the data (the 
                                                 
16 The wage OLS estimation is reported in Table 7 in the Appendix. 
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Treatment Effect model, Table 2, column 3), the wage differential is also underestimated by 
7.3 percent.  
 
Are wages a utility equalizing device in the sense of the theory of compensating differentials? 
The four countries examined in this study are very different in terms of labour demand and 
supply and institutional factors such as labour market centralization, union membership rates, 
etc. For instance, an issue that often raises debate on the validity of the theory of 
compensating differentials is its assumption of a perfectly competitive labour market. If the 
labour market is not perfectly competitive, the compensating wage differentials may be weak 
or even absent. The countries studied here have different labour market conditions. On one 
hand, in the UK the labour market is characterized by higher flexibility and employers must 
propose a higher risk premium, in order to attract workers, whereas in France and Greece the 
labour market is more centralized and wage determination is coordinated by institutional 
mechanisms in which the individualization of wages is not completely developed (Brizard, 
2004).  
 
Additionally, some studies find that compensating wage differentials are inversely correlated 
with unemployment. Thus, in countries where unemployment is relatively low and, 
consequently, job opportunities wider (like in our case, UK), workers earn a higher risk 
premium. Purse (2004) points out that workers confronted with a higher level of 
unemployment, especially those with a low level of education and few marketable skills, may 
be much less likely to quit their job, irrespective of whether or not it is hazardous. If this is 
the case in countries such as Greece and France, where the unemployment rate is higher 
compared to UK, the risk premium would be smaller or even absent. We address this issue 
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by the use of appropriate interaction terms rather than estimating a different model for each 
country which would require a higher number of observations per country. 
 
As mentioned above and according to the theory of compensating differentials, the wage 
differential that enters into satisfaction equations should be zero. Therefore, it would be 
expected that the coefficient of the wage differential estimated from these equations should 
not be significant. The econometric evidence from the risk-specific partial satisfaction 
regression (Table 3) shows that the wage differential yields lower satisfaction for Greek and 
British workers. This could probably mean that if dangerous jobs are also the low-paid ones,   
workers could be dissatisfied even if risk were compensated for, because even well-paid 
individuals would be paid less if they were in a dangerous job. In other words, risk is not 
fully compensated in the labour marker, thus reducing satisfaction. This result suggests that 
the market might possibly not clear, implying that workers who choose a dangerous job do so 
because they have no other alternative. In this line Purse (2004), who criticized the perfect 
mobility assumption, pointed out that “if workers do not have the freedom to change jobs 
when faced with unacceptable risks arising from their work, the presumed imperative placed 
on employers by the market to compensate them is correspondingly reduced. In the real 
world, workers are completely free to change jobs whenever they feel inclined to do so” 
(p.598). In the estimates reported in Table 3, it is also interesting to note that, in the second 
specification, the interaction term between wage differentials and trade union is not 
significant, whereas in the first specification, unionized workers are less satisfied with their 
job riskiness. This suggests that unionized workers’ wages capture the corresponding 
workers’ dissatisfaction.  
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As a robustness test, we rerun the whole estimation using the measure of overall job 
satisfaction instead of satisfaction with job risk (see Table 4 ). It is found that higher wage 
differentials do yield extra satisfaction for French and British workers. This may be explained 
by the fact that wage is not the only argument in a worker’s utility function. People could feel 
satisfied with their jobs even if they were not sufficiently compensated for working in a 
dangerous one. An explanation could be provided by using the multidimensional model of 
overall job satisfaction (Skalli et al, 2008). According to this model, overall utility of a job is 
the result of an aggregation of all sub-utilities related to a different mix of job characteristics 
(such as working conditions, security, type of work, wages etc.).  
 
An individual could remain equally satisfied with his/her job if certain characteristics of the 
job changed, like for example, when working conditions deteriorate but this is accompanied 
by a permanent job contract in a way that the overall job satisfaction remains the same. 
Thus, two different mixes of characteristics for the same job may be viewed by the worker as 
equally attractive, provided that a low content in one desirable property is compensated by an 
increase in another. 
 
In this way, a worker may be willing to accept voluntarily a risky job if he/she is 
compensated with more of another desirable attribute in a way that his/her satisfaction 
remains the same; e.g. a risky job which provides more security in terms of unemployment 
expectations, more convenient working time schedules and not particularly higher wages as 
wages present only one dimension of a job among others. 
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6. Conclusions 
This study tests the central implication of the theory of compensating differentials that 
workers are indifferent between risky and safe jobs in labour market equilibrium as long as 
wages serve as a utility equalizing device. Using satisfaction with job-related risk as a partial 
measure of overall job satisfaction we examine whether wage differentials act as a utility 
equalizing device counterbalancing job risk. We have used a selectivity corrected model in 
order to overcome biases present in previous related studies. It turns out that it is important to 
adjust for selectivity.  
The econometric evidence shows that the wage premium for being in a dangerous job, is not 
sufficient to equalize workers’ risk-related partial utility across job types. This could 
probably mean that dangerous jobs are also low-pay ones. Nevertheless, the wage differential 
yields higher overall job satisfaction and this probably says that workers are, in general, 
happy with their wages, although not sufficiently compensated for their job’s riskiness. An 
explanation for this is that different job characteristics are substitutable, making a worker 
with low potential earnings in a safe job willing to accept a riskier job if he/she is sufficiently 
compensated with more of another desirable attribute. Thus, policies focusing on job 
characteristics reflected on overall job satisfaction would be as important as policies focusing 
on the level of pay. This, however, requires the design of a regulatory framework that 
promotes the transition of workers from one state (low pay/low quality) to another (high 
pay/high quality), by improving the dynamics that lead to jobs of superior quality and by 
encouraging occupational and regional mobility. And probably this is even more crucial in 
countries with a high level of employment protection, where as stated by Gielen and 
Tatsiramos (2011) it induces the employed worker to stay in a low satisfaction job until a 
better job is found. 
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Policy makers should aim at designing specific measures which, apart from the objective risk 
of a job take into account the subjective perception of workers regarding their jobs’ riskiness. 
Firms could also benefit from findings like those presented here to improve their workers’ 
satisfaction using less costly strategies.  
Future research could check the robustness of our results in a broader set of countries. It 
would also be necessary to extend the analysis to part time jobs which seem to constitute an 
especially interesting field for job risk management by regulators and firms.  
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 Appendix  
Table 5  
Sample descriptive statistics 
Variables 
Safe Jobs Dangerous 
jobs 
 Mean(SD) 
Satisfaction with the job related 
risk (1 to 10) 
7.3(2.6) 5.07(2.8) 
Overall Job Satisfaction (1 to 10) 6.8(2.01) 6.5(2.1) 
Net hourly wage (euros) 7.8(4.8) 6.7(5.1) 
Household member’s income 0.65 0.59 
Male (dummy) 0.40 0.67 
Married (dummy) 0.67 0.71 
Tenure (years in firm) 8.1(8.8) 8.7(8.5) 
Primary education (dummy) 0.19 0.31 
Secondary  education (dummy) 0.41 0.41 
Upper secondary  education 
(dummy) 
0.39 0.28 
Member of Union (dummy) 0.17 0.29 
Managers_Prof  (dummy) 0.15 0.18 
Clerk (dummy) 0.38 0.12 
Craft and Skilled workers 
(dummy) 
0.06 0.24 
Sales (dummy) 0.18 0.15 
Other_Occupat (dummy) 0.23 0.31 
Past Unemployment experience 
(dummy) 
0.09 0.10 
Industrial sector (dummy) 0.10 0.22 
Service sector (dummy) 0.75 0.64 
Other _sector (dummy) 0.15 0.14 
Private (dummy) 0.69 0.67 
France (dummy) 0.25 0.28 
The Netherlands (dummy) 0.29 0.17 
Greece (dummy) 0.14 0.33 
The UK (dummy) 0.32 0.22 
Observations 1,934 1,096 
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Table 6 
 Variable List 
Variables Definition 
Satisfaction with Physical 
risk (1 to 10) 
Standardized score of an individual’ s satisfaction with risk, which is measured on an eleven point scale of 0=not at all satisfied to 
10=very satisfied 
Overall Job Satisfaction Standardized score of an individual’ s  overall job satisfaction, which is measured on an eleven point scale of 0=not at all satisfied 
to 10=very satisfied 
Dangerous jobs Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual replies that his/her job is dangerous frequently or sometimes and 0 otherwise 
Net hourly wage Log of CPI-deflated hourly wage in euros 
Age (years) Age of the respondent in years (18 to 65) 
Male  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is a man 
Married  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is married or cohabits 
Tenure (years in firm) Number of years of the respondent with current employer 
Low education Dummy variable – Less than second stage of secondary level education 
Secondary education Dummy variable- Second stage of secondary level education 
Upper secondary education Dummy variable – Post-secondary level education 
Member of Union Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is in a trade union 
Managers_Professional Dummy variable- Managers & Professionals and associate professional 
Clerks  Dummy variable—Clerks and service occupations 
Craft and Skilled workers  Dummy variable- Craft, related trades workers, plant, machine operators and assemblers 
Sales Dummy variable- Service and Sales workers 
Other_Occupations Dummy variable –Armed forces-other occupations  
Past Unemployment 
experience  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has weeks of unemployment during the last year and 0 otherwise 
 
Working in private sector Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent works in the private sector 
Industrial sector Dummy with value 1 for workers in the agricultural sector, manufacturing and electricity, mining and gas and water supply sector 
Service sector Dummy with value 1 for workers in the service sector; wholesale, hotels, transport, financial intermediation, real estate, education 
health and social work 
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Other _sector Dummy with value 1 for workers in the sector of other activities 
Firmsize_24  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent works in a firm with number of employees :1 to 24 people 
Firm size_99 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent works in a firm with number of employees: 25 to 99 people 
Firm size more than 100  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent works in a firm with number of employees: more than 100 people 
Countries Dummy variables for the following countries: France, Great Britain, Greece, and the Netherlands. 
Household member’s  
income 
Dummy variable with value 1 if the respondent has a member in the family who provides the household with extra income 
and 0 otherwise 
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Table 7:Wage equation, OLS Estimation 
Variables Coef. t-stat 
Dangerous job  -0.062       3.22*** 
Married   0.054        3.14*** 
Male   0.131 7.80*** 
Tenure   0.020        6.34*** 
Tenure2/100  -0.038        3.71*** 
Secondary education   0.061 2.81*** 
Upper secondary education   0.113       5.00*** 
Trade Union Mb   0.039        2.08* 
Manager   0.229        8.66*** 
Clerk   0.128        5.35*** 
Craft_skilled   0.039        0.40 
Other occupant.   0.090        3.63*** 
Private  -0.048        2.72** 
Unemployment Experience  -0.062        2.19** 
Firm size<99   0.015        0.75 
Firm size>100   0.044        2.14** 
Service_sector  -0.053        1.94* 
Other sector  -0.047        1.57 
Greece  -0.955      43.40*** 
France  -0.172       8.50*** 
UK  -0.430   16.26*** 
Constant   1.912    35.53*** 
Observations 3,030 
Adjusted R
2
 0.49 
